Informed Consent Beyond the Physician-Patient Encounter: Tort Law Implications of Extra-Clinical Decision Support Tools. by Sawicki, Nadia N.
Loyola University Chicago, School of Law
LAW eCommons
Faculty Publications & Other Works
2012
Informed Consent Beyond the Physician-Patient
Encounter: Tort Law Implications of Extra-Clinical
Decision Support Tools.
Nadia N. Sawicki
Loyola University Chicago, nsawicki@luc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/facpubs
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications & Other Works
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sawicki, Nadia N., Informed Consent Beyond the Physician-Patient Encounter: Tort Law Implications of Extra-Clinical Decision
Support Tools, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1 (2012).
Annals of Health Law - ASLME Special Edition
evolving informed consent practices.
I. SHARED DECISION-MAKING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRA-
CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT TOOLS
The shared decision-making ("SDM") movement developed over the
past thirty years as a response to growing disenchantment with existing
informed consent practices among the medical and patient communities.
Spurred in part by Jack Wennberg's influential research on practice
variations in preference-sensitive care,' the SDM movement seeks to assist
patients in choosing among medical interventions when clinical evidence
alone does not identify a favored option. The SDM model has been touted
as potentially improving patient satisfaction, clinical outcomes, cost of care,
and physician time management. The American Medical Association
("AMA") notes that use of SDM "could help improve the medical liability
climate" by reducing the practice of defensive medicine.2  The 2010
Salzburg Statement on Shared Decision Making describes the use of SDM
as "an ethical imperative" for clinicians,3 and the United States' recent
health reform promotes SDM as a model for clinical practice.
The SDM model is able to accomplish these goals in part by virtue of its
reliance on decision support tools to supplement the conversation between
physician and patient. Decision support tools can take a variety of forms,
including brochures, videos, interactive websites, and CD-ROMs, as well as
"structured personal coaching" with a trained intermediary. These tools
"collect and analyze the latest clinical evidence regarding the risks and
benefits of different treatment options," including why there may be a lack
of evidence to support one treatment over another, "and then present the
information in a manner patients can understand." 6  Unlike traditional
1. See generally, JOHN E. WENNBERG, TRACKING MEDICINE: A RESEARCHER'S QUEST TO
UNDERSTAND HEALTH CARE (Oxford 2010).
2. BARBARA L. McANENY, REPORT OF THE AMA COUNSEL ON MEDICAL SERVICE, CMS
REPORT 7-A-10, SHARED DECISION-MAKING 4, available at http://www.ama-
assn.org/resources/doc/cms/al0-cms-rpt-7.pdf.
3. The author was one of 58 people from 18 countries who attended a Salzburg Global
Seminar in December 2010 to consider the role patients should play in healthcare decisions.
The Salzburg Statement on Medical Decision Making is the result of this collaboration. It is
forthcoming in the British Medical Journal, and is currently available at
http://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.dl745.full.pdf.
4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 3506 [hereinafter
PPACA].
5. McANENY, supra note 2, at 2.
6. Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The
Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 464 (2006). See also
PPACA § 936 ("The term 'patient decision aid' means an educational tool that helps
patients, caregivers or authorized representatives understand and communicate their beliefs
and preferences related to their treatment options, and to decide with their health care
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informed consent documents, however, decision aids not only provide
factual information, but also assist patients in identifying the values and
preferences that are important to them, and guiding them in the process of
matching their values with available treatment options. Decision support
tools are available for a variety of clinical conditions; the most common
ones address the treatment of breast cancer, prostate cancer, osteoarthritis
and osteoporosis, childbirth, and end of life care.
While some decision support tools are used by physicians in face-to-face
clinical encounters, many are intended for independent patient use.7 Often,
a physician may "prescribe" such a tool for the patient to review before her
next appointment, which then better prepares the patient for the in-office
informed consent conversation.8  Decision aids are intended as
complements to, not replacements for, the physician-patient interaction.
They encourage the patient to engage in a deliberative process earlier and
more thoroughly than in traditional informed consent practice.
This article focuses primarily on SDM, which, given its reliance on
decision aids and third-party coaching, may be the most obvious example of
the gradual shift towards the use of extra-clinical tools to supplement the
informed consent process. However, SDM's use of decision support tools
is part of a much larger trend. One of the earliest examples of this shift
occurred in the mid-1970's, with the involvement of genetic counselors in
patient decisions about genetic testing, treatment, and reproductive options.
Although primary care physicians would often order genetic tests for their
patients, these physicians were not always best situated to counsel patients
about the implications of testing. As a result, many would arrange for
genetic counseling by other health professionals (often trained in masters'
level programs) who would assist the patient in choosing an appropriate
course of action. A more modem example of extra-clinical informed
consent tools is the state-written abortion pamphlet, which many states
require patients to review as part of the informed consent process. While
state laws require that these pamphlets be distributed in physicians' offices,
at least one state has taken more extreme steps to exclude medical providers
from the informed consent process - Michigan allows a woman seeking an
abortion to complete the consent process entirely online, by clicking
through information on the internet, printing out a confirmation of
completion, and presenting it to her physician.
This shift away from the traditional physician-patient model of informed
provider what treatments are best for them based on their treatment options, scientific
evidence, circumstances, beliefs, and preferences.").
7. See Glyn Elwyn et al., Investing in Deliberation: A Definition and Classification of
Decision Support Interventions for People Facing Difficult Health Decisions, 30 MED.
DECISION MAKING 701, 703 (2010).
8. MCANENY, supra note 2, at 3.
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consent is grounded in distinct concerns about physicians' ability to execute
the informed consent process effectively. Concerns range from the
physicians' lack of time to engage in comprehensive informed consent
conversations, to a lack of communication skills, to societal pressures
towards incorporating third party values into the medical encounter.
Whatever the reasons for this trend, however, it has dramatically changed
existing models of informed consent and, in turn, their legal implications.
II. EXISTING LIABILITY CONCERNS
Despite the promise of SDM and its incorporation of extra-clinical tools
into the informed consent encounter, real-world implementation of SDM
has been limited, in part due to liability concerns. Some commentators fear
that physicians who use SDM may be opening themselves up to expanded
tort liability for deviating from the existing standard of care. Articles in
both legal and medical journals advocating the use of SDM and patient
decision aids typically cite the possibility of physician liability as a barrier
to implementation. 9 Legislators in at least one state have responded to these
concerns by providing additional statutory protections for physicians who
use SDM. Washington, which defines SDM as the process by which a
patient and her health care provider discuss information about proposed
treatment "with the use of a patient decision aid,"10 establishes a legal
presumption in favor of the physician when SDM is used. The Washington
law provides that a patient's signature on an "acknowledgement of shared
decision making" constitutes prima facie evidence of informed consent that
can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence." In contrast, a
patient who signs a traditional informed consent form need only satisfy a
preponderance of evidence standard to rebut the presumption of consent.
As commentators have noted, Washington's approach provides physicians
who use decision support tools in accordance with SDM "significant legal
protection" above and beyond that provided by traditional informed consent
9. In 2008, for example, the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics published the results of
a study evaluating potential jurors' reactions to a hypothetical SDM malpractice suit.
Michael J. Barry et al., Reactions of Potential Jurors to a Hypothetical Malpractice Suit
Alleging Failure to Perform a Prostate-Specific Antigen Test, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 396
(2008). The study varied the level of disclosure by the physician, specifically varying the
types of decision aids the patient was exposed to. Id. See also, Elwyn et al., supra note 7, at
704 ("[I]t seems only a matter of time until the legal accountabilities of patient decision
support interventions will need further specification."); Benjamin Moulton & Jaime S. King,
Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice, 38
J.L. MED. & ETHics 85, 92 (2010) (suggesting that providing legislative protections for
physicians who use SDM, as was recently done in Washington State, would facilitate SDM
implementation).
10. Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70.060(3) (2011).
11. Id.
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III. THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF LIABILITY FOR EXTRA-CLINICAL
INFORMED CONSENT
Limiting liability for physicians who use decision aids as part of SDM is
an important first step in developing a legal regime that accommodates
extra-clinical informed consent. However, because existing concerns about
physician liability are only part of a multitude of potential legal challenges
to the implementation of this model, legislative responses such as
Washington's may be inadequate. In moving the locus of informed consent
outside the clinical encounter, SDM fundamentally changes the nature of
informed consent practice - and, therefore, its legal risks. First, it expands
the scope of traditional malpractice liability for participating medical
providers. Second, it raises additional legal risks associated with faulty
decision aids.
A. Expanded Liability for Participating Medical Providers
Physicians have long faced tort liability for breach of informed consent if
a patient is harmed as a result of the physician's failure to provide the
information needed to make an informed medical decision. However, with
increased reliance on extra-clinical informed consent mechanisms comes an
increased risk of malpractice liability.
First, a physician might face liability for over-reliance on patient
decision aids. While decision aids are designed to support (rather than
replace) the physician-patient conversation, one can imagine the SDM
process going the way of traditional informed consent, with physicians
relying on documentation at the expense of discussion. The physician who
simply instructs her patient to consult a decision aid and then asks for the
patient's decision at the next appointment would, under even the most
traditional tort principles, be liable for malpractice. Failure to engage fully
in the informed consent process, even if decision support tools are made
available, is a clear breach of the standard of care for both traditional
informed consent and SDM.
Second, because SDM may involve patient consultation and discussion
with other medical personnel - including nurses, social workers,
counselors, and decision coaches - the risk of informed consent liability
will also be expanded to these providers. A patient who is harmed as a
result of receiving misinformation, biased information, or inadequate
guidance from a decision coach might bring suit against this person in
addition to the patient's physician. In the context of genetic counseling, for
12. Moulton & King, supra note 9, at 92.
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example, patients have sometimes sought to recover against genetic
counselors whose negligence makes it impossible for the patient to make a
truly informed choice, even where the counseling is non-directive in nature.
B. Liability Associated with Faulty Decision Aids
A more significant source of expanded liability may arise if a decision
aid used in the SDM process is faulty, misleading, or biased. While
providing outdated or otherwise factually incorrect information is always a
risk in informed consent, decision aids also pose a significant possibility of
explicit or implicit bias. The AMA, for example, has expressed concern
about the creation of decision support tools that are "misleading or biased
toward or against certain treatment choices," perhaps with the goal of
"encourag[ing] patients to choose less expensive options."' The risk of
bias may be even greater when the decision at issue is highly controversial,
such as end-of-life care or abortion. For example, many state pamphlets
designed to educate women about the abortion process appear to favor
pregnancy over abortion, either explicitly or implicitly, by means of biased
framing of facts and inclusion of images or other information not typically
provided in traditional informed consent. 14
Virtually all commentators who have written about SDM recognize that
the success of a process that relies greatly on extra-clinical tools and
materials is dependent on the quality of those materials. For this reason,
some private organizations provide oversight and evaluation of decision
support tools, particularly with respect to potential conflicts of interest by
the creators.15  More importantly, the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act's ("PPACA") provisions supporting the use of SDM provide for
the establishment of a committee of "a broad range of experts and key
stakeholders" that will develop "consensus-based standards" for evaluating
and certifying patient decision aids.16  Such regulatory mechanisms are
clearly aimed at ensuring that decision support tools are accurate and
unbiased. However, it is naYve to think that regulatory and certification
standards alone will be absolutely effective in ensuring quality. If the
certification process fails for any reason - whether as a result of bias,
industry capture, or simple human error - patients using faulty decision aids
may be harmed. And because the current tort system, described below,
makes it quite difficult for patients in this situation to recover from decision
13. MCANENY, supra note 2, at 4.
14. See generally, Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More
Light, Less Heat. 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming, 2011)
15. Examples of such organizations include the Ottawa Hospital Research Institute, the
International Patient Decision Aid Standards (IPDAS) Collaboration, and the New America
Foundation. See generally, MCANENY, supra note 2, at 3.
16. PPACA § 936(c).
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aid creators, certifiers, or physician users, patients will have few
opportunities for compensation to make them whole. Accordingly, it is not
unreasonable to expect that the tort system will soon shift to accommodate
claims by patients who are harmed by faulty decision aids. This section
explores these possibilities.
1. Decision Aid Creators
When a patient suffers a legally-cognizable harm as a result of using an
inaccurate, biased, or otherwise faulty decision aid, she may wish to pursue
a tort claim against the creator of the decision aid. For a number of reasons,
however, it is very unlikely that such a claim would succeed.17
First, although products liability law sometimes subjects creators of
faulty products to strict liability (that is, liability regardless of fault),
decision support tools do not fall within the legal definition of a "product"
and so are not subject to strict liability. Written pamphlets, brochures, and
books occupy a unique position in modem tort law. Courts have
consistently held that strict liability will not apply where harm arises as a
result of the words or ideas within a book or similar product. As the Ninth
Circuit wrote in Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, "[w]e place a high value on
the unfettered exchange of ideas. .. . The threat of liability without fault
could seriously inhibit those who wish to share thoughts and theories." 8
Given that strict liability is not an option, the most promising alternative
may be to bring suit against the author or publisher under a theory of
negligent misrepresentation. However, most negligent misrepresentation
claims against authors and publishers of informational brochures fail for
lack of privity. Authors of books aimed at the general public, for example,
have consistently been found to owe no duty of care to readers, even where
the book provides instructions and information about improving one's
health.19 In Roman v. City of New York, the only case this author was able
to identify dealing with medical publications, plaintiff brought a negligent
misrepresentation claim against Planned Parenthood on the basis of faulty
17. The limitations on liability for creators of faulty medical tools has already been
recognized in the context of clinical practice guidelines. See generally Ronen Avraham,
Clinical Practice Guidelines: The Warped Incentives in the U.S. Healthcare System, 37 AM.
J.L. & MED. 7 (2011); Daniel Jutras, Clinical Practice Guidelines as Legal Norms, 148 CAN.
MED. Ass'N. J. 905, 908 (1993);.
18. Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming
district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant, publisher of a mushroom
encyclopedia that allegedly caused plaintiff's collection and ingestion of toxic mushrooms).
19. See, e.g., Gorran v. Atkins Nutritionals, Inc., 464 F.Supp.2d 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(plaintiff injured by high-fat and high-protein diet failed to demonstrate a duty on the part of
defendant, a diet advocate and author); Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic, 952 P.2d 768 (Colo.
App. 1997) (no duty owed by dentist who wrote a book encouraging removal of dental
amalgams).
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information provided in a booklet she was given at her physician's office.
The court found no duty on the part of Planned Parenthood, noting that the
defendant "pointedly intended the booklet to provide information to the
general public, including plaintiff, and the fact that it could have reasonably
foreseen plaintiffs reliance thereon, does not change the result. . . . [T]he
relational duty sufficient to give rise to a cause of action in negligent
misrepresentation is not present." 20 Based on this precedent, it is extremely
unlikely that a company that creates decision aids for use by medical
consumers would be found to owe a duty of care to the users of these
decision aids under existing tort law.
Patients raising tort claims against creators of faulty decision aids are
likely to face problems of proof as well. While it may be easy to prove that
factual information included in a decision aid is incorrect or outdated,
patients alleging bias or misrepresentation may have trouble convincing a
jury that such bias rises to the level of negligent misrepresentation or fraud.
For example, although studies clearly establish that presenting risk in
absolute, rather than relative terms is more effective when communicating
information to patients, a jury may be unwilling to impose liability based on
a difference in framing. Moreover, as in many informed consent cases, the
patient may have difficulty proving causation - namely, that had the
decision aid been different, a reasonable patient would not have been
harmed.
2. Decision Aid Certifiers
Given that the likelihood of liability for creators of faulty decision
support tools is currently limited, patients who are harmed by these tools
may wish to pursue claims against any certifying bodies that approved the
tools for patient use.
PPACA, for example, envisions that patient decision aids would be
certified by an independent committee of impartial experts, who would also
be responsible for establishing relevant standards. Although the details of
the process are as yet unspecified, PPACA provides that the committee
would be part of an entity under contract with the Federal government.21
However, these entities are unlikely to face tort liability for the
certification of faulty decision aids. If the certifying body is a government
agency, its liability would be clearly preempted by Tort Claims Act, as is
the case with the Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection
Agency, and other agencies responsible for establishing and enforcing
regulatory standards. If, instead, the certifying body is a private
20. Roman v. City of New York, 442 N.Y.S. 2d 945 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
21. PPACA § 936(c).
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organization, the privity considerations applicable to decision aid creators
(described above) are likely to limit liability. Generally, third parties who
guarantee or endorse a product whose primary purpose is the circulation of
information to consumers or the general public will not face liability unless
privity is established.
3. Physician and Institutional Users of Decision Aids
Finally, a patient harmed by a faulty decision aid might seek tort
recovery against the physician who recommended or prescribed it. Such
liability would presumably be grounded in the learned intermediary
doctrine, which establishes that physicians' special knowledge of medical
practice may, in some cases, relieve product manufacturers and information
providers (typically, pharmaceutical companies that distribute package
inserts) from liability. Where the information provided by the product
manufacturer itself is faulty, however, it is unclear whether physicians will
be liable. Liability may depend in part on whether the physician read or
reviewed the information before providing it to the patient. Ultimately,
these decisions come down to a weighing of competing policy factors - on
the one hand, that physicians are entitled to rely on the advice of third
parties and should not bear liability for the negligence of those over whom
they have no control, and on the other, that physicians ought not abdicate
their duty to provide quality care just because they are relying on third-party
information. Similar arguments can be raised with respect to institutional
enterprise liability - for example, if a hospital system requires physicians to
use decision aids as part of the informed consent process for particular
conditions.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
It is clear that medical providers who prescribe or use decision support
tools in accordance with the tenets of SDM may face tort liability if they
misuse the tools or provide negligent counseling. This is a simple and
relatively uncontroversial expansion of traditional malpractice liability. But
the use of decision support tools also poses a secondary problem - namely,
that patients may be harmed if the decision aids they use are faulty,
misleading, or biased. If the regulatory or certification process aimed at
ensuring the quality of decision aids fails, injured patients will look to tort
law to provide a remedy. And since current tort doctrine makes it
extremely difficult for such claims to succeed, it is time for policymakers
and legal scholars to evaluate the costs and benefits of expanding tort
liability in these cases.
If a physician prescribes a decision aid that is faulty as a result of the
creator's negligence, but was nevertheless certified by a regulatory entity,
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should the patient who is harmed as a result be able to recover from any or
all of these parties? This question can only be answered once a number of
key policy questions are resolved - for example, which party is in the best
position to prevent patients from harm, and which party bears greatest
moral responsibility for the patients' injuries. My preliminary conclusion on
this issue is that, if the regulatory process fails, the creators of faulty
22decision aids ought to bear liability for any resulting harms. They are in
the best position to correct the problem, and despite the lack of formal
privity, they are marketing their products with the expectation and intent
that medical consumers will rely on them when making important medical
decisions. Although certifiers of decision aids are also in a position to
prevent harm, our legal system is generally reluctant to impose tort liability
on those who merely guarantee or certify products created by third parties,
particularly when they are complying with statutory and regulatory
requirements. Finally, physicians, while obviously responsible for the
quality of care they provide to patients, cannot be expected to have absolute
expertise in every area of medical treatment, and ought not be held liable
for the negligence of third party information providers over whom they
have no control.
Regardless of how we resolve the issue of tort liability for injuries
resulting from faulty decision aids, however, this discussion highlights a
key lesson about the expanded use of extra-clinical informed consent tools
- namely, that by significantly changing the nature of the informed consent
process, this development is likely to change the landscape of legal liability.
Only once we recognize this fact and begin to weigh the policy arguments
for and against the expansion of liability can we effectively implement
much-needed reforms to an informed consent process that is widely
perceived as flawed.
22. 1 explore this conclusion further in a subsequent article, Nadia Sawicki, Regulatory
Failures and Patient Safety: Using Tort Law to Ensure Decision Support Tool Quality (Oct.
30, 2011) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Using Informed Consent to Reduce Preventable
Medical Errors
Evelyn M Tenenbaum*
Experts are increasingly recognizing that informed consent can be a
valuable tool in advancing patient safety. Preventable medical errors kill
and seriously injure thousands of Americans each year, causing personal
tragedy and costing the healthcare system billions of dollars. Giving
patients more information about their treatments can make them important
partners in reducing these mistakes. The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act ("PPACA"), the new federal health care legislation, provides
grants for "integrat[ing] quality improvement and patient safety in the
clinical education of health professionals."' These grants are a perfect
opportunity to educate future healthcare providers on the importance of
giving patients the information they need to assist in preventing medical
errors. The informed consent process is an ideal vehicle to convey this
information because the process is already in place, making it a convenient
and inexpensive route to the patient.
More than a decade ago, the Institute of Medicine ("IOM") released its
groundbreaking report, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health Care
System ("1999 IOM report"), estimating that 44,000 to 98,000 patients die
annually in hospitals as a result of preventable medical errors. This large
number of mistakes made medical errors the eighth leading cause of death
in the United States for that year, exceeding deaths from car accidents,
breast cancer, and AIDS. The costs associated with these errors were
estimated to be as high as 29 billion dollars in 1999.2 In response to this
report, federal and state governments and private industry instituted various
programs to improve patient safety. But those efforts were generally
unsuccessful in significantly reducing preventable medical errors.
A 2008 study by the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") found that one out of every seven hospitalized Medicare
. Professor of Law at Albany Law School and a Professor of Medical Education at Albany
Medical College. I would like to thank my research assistants Chelsea Cerutti, Erika Hauser,
and Joanna Pericone for their insights and assistance.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.L. 111-148, § 3508 (2011) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299(b), 3508(a), 294(j)) [hereinafter PPACA].
2. INST. OF MED., To ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1, 2 (Linda T.
Kohn et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter To ERR IS HUMAN].
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